[2022-09-19] 经济学人 - 下一代思维
![]() Next-generation thinking
New leaders will soon inhabit many of China’s top posts. Will they make a difference?
下一代思维
新领导人很快将占据中国的许多高层职位。 他们会有所作为吗？
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FOR AN ASPIRING Communist Party bigwig, Hu Chunhua’s back story seems hard to beat. One of six siblings born into rural poverty, he was the first in his county to attend China’s prestigious Peking University. On graduation in 1983, he joined the party and volunteered to work in Tibet. There he caught the eye of the local party chief, Hu Jintao (no relation), who became China’s top leader in 2002. Soon Hu Chunhua (pictured) was the youngest provincial governor and a member of the party’s Central Committee. Insiders began referring to him as “little Hu” and as one of the favourites to become China’s leader in 2022.
对于一个有抱负的共产党大佬来说，胡春华的背景故事似乎很难被击败。 作为出生在农村贫困地区的六个兄弟姐妹之一，他是该县第一个就读于中国著名的北京大学的人。 1983年毕业入党，自愿到西藏工作。 在那里，他引起了当地党委书记胡锦涛（无亲属关系）的注意，胡锦涛于 2002 年成为中国最高领导人。不久，胡春华（如图）成为最年轻的省长和中共中央委员。 内部人士开始称他为“小胡”，是 2022 年成为中国领导人的热门人选之一。
The chances of that happening now are vanishingly slim. Xi Jinping, aged 69, is widely expected to secure a third five-year term as leader at a party congress in October, breaking recent retirement norms. He could hold the top post for another decade—or more. Yet Hu Chunhua, at 59, may still join the new Politburo Standing Committee, the top leadership body, which now has seven members. And he remains a preeminent figure in the “sixth generation” of party leaders, which will probably supply most of the 25-member Politburo and the roughly 200-strong Central Committee.
现在发生这种情况的可能性微乎其微。 人们普遍预计，现年 69 岁的习近平将在 10 月的一次党代会上获得第三个五年的领导人任期，这打破了最近的退休规范。 他可以再担任十年或更长时间的最高职位。 然而，现年 59 岁的胡春华可能仍会加入新的政治局常委，这是最高领导机构，现在有七名成员。 他仍然是党的“第六代”领导人中的杰出人物，可能会为 25 名政治局成员和大约 200 人的中央委员会中的大部分人提供支持。
Despite Mr Xi’s continuing dominance, the generational shift matters. These figures will head ministries, provinces and big party offices. It also raises questions. Among them: how will these newcomers influence decision-making, especially on the economy and covid-19? Will other top leaders observe the norm of retiring once they are 68 or over? And will a sixth-generation figure eventually replace Mr Xi or will he pick a successor from the seventh?
尽管习近平继续占据主导地位，但代际转变很重要。 这些人物将领导各部委、省和大党办公室。 它也提出了问题。 其中：这些新来者将如何影响决策，尤其是在经济和武汉肺炎方面？ 其他最高领导人会遵守 68 岁或以上退休的规范吗？ 第六代人物最终会取代习近平，还是会从第七代中挑选继任者？
One defining feature of the sixth generation, mostly born after 1960, is that it was the first to come of age amid the growing prosperity, relative stability and warming relations with the West that followed Mao Zedong’s death in 1976. That affected members’ education in particular. Like most of the fifth generation, Mr Xi was withdrawn from school in the 1960s and sent to work in the countryside. After seven years there he reached university, but only as a “worker-peasant-soldier”. Members of the sixth generation, by contrast, entered university after teaching was deradicalised. Most did postgraduate studies, often abroad. Chen Jining, the 58-year-old Beijing mayor and Politburo hopeful, did a PhD at Imperial College in London.
第六代人（大部分出生于 1960 年以后）的一个显着特征是，在 1976 年毛泽东逝世后日益繁荣、相对稳定和与西方关系升温的情况下，他们是第一个成年的。这影响了成员的教育 特定。 与大多数第五代人一样，习近平在 1960 年代辍学并被送往农村工作。 在那里七年后，他上了大学，但只是作为“工农兵”。 相比之下，第六代的成员在教学被去激进化后才进入大学。 大多数人都在国外读过研究生。 58 岁的北京市长、政治局候选人陈吉宁在伦敦帝国理工学院攻读博士学位。
Another sixth-generation characteristic is the predominance of technocrats, mostly engineers and scientists, several of whom have led state-owned enterprises. Seven or eight such figures could join the Politburo, says Cheng Li of the Brookings Institution, a think-tank. A strong subgroup—dubbed “the Cosmos Club”—has a background in aerospace, reflecting Mr Xi’s emphasis on defence and technology.
第六代的另一个特征是技术官僚占主导地位，主要是工程师和科学家，其中一些人曾领导过国有企业。 智库布鲁金斯学会的李成说，七八位这样的人物可能会加入政治局。 一个强大的小组——被称为“宇宙俱乐部”——拥有航空航天背景，反映了习近平对国防和技术的重视。
Yet some question whether such qualifications matter when Mr Xi prizes loyalty above all. Ministers and provincial leaders have some leeway in how they implement central directives but little space to innovate. “They know Xi’s not that policy-savvy, but there’s nothing they can do,” says Bo Zhiyue, a New Zealand-based expert on Chinese politics. “If you show your true colours, you can be in danger.”
然而，一些人质疑，当习近平把忠诚放在首位时，这些资格是否重要。 部长和省领导在执行中央指令方面有一定的余地，但创新空间不大。 “他们知道习近平不是那么精通政策，但他们无能为力，”新西兰的中国政治专家薄志岳说。 “如果你表现出你的本色，你可能会处于危险之中。”
Up-and-coming technocrats are also matched, if not outnumbered, by those with personal ties to Mr Xi, including some who share his north-western roots and others who worked with him in Zhejiang, Fujian or Shanghai. Zhejiang protégés include Li Qiang and Chen Miner, now the party chiefs of Shanghai and Chongqing. Ding Xuexiang, who heads the party’s General Office, served Mr Xi in Shanghai. All three are already Politburo members—and front-runners for further promotion.
崭露头角的技术官僚也与那些与习近平有私人联系的人相匹敌，其中包括一些与他有西北渊源的人，以及其他与他在浙江、福建或上海共事的人。 浙江的门生包括李强和陈敏儿，他们现在是上海和重庆的党委书记。 党的办公厅主任丁学祥在上海为习近平服务。 这三个人都已经是政治局委员——并且是进一步晋升的领跑者。
Who ultimately joins the new Standing Committee will depend, in part, on whether current members aged 68 or over (except Mr Xi) retire. If so, two slots open up. But Mr Xi could force others to step down, making way for more new blood. The body could shrink or expand, as it has before. There may be surprises too: Sun Zhengcai, a Politburo member and potential Xi heir, was sacked just before the last congress in 2017 and later convicted of bribery.
谁最终加入新的常委会，部分取决于68岁或以上的现任委员（习近平除外）是否退休。 如果是这样，则打开两个插槽。 但习近平可能会迫使其他人下台，为更多新鲜血液让路。 身体可以像以前一样收缩或膨胀。 也可能有惊喜：政治局委员、潜在的习继承人孙政才在 2017 年上届全国代表大会前夕被解职，后来被判受贿罪名成立。
The new line-up could also reflect the degree to which recent setbacks compel Mr Xi to compromise. One indication will be what happens to 67-year-old Li Keqiang, who is expected to step down as prime minister. Another is Hu Chunhua’s fate. Despite his best efforts (he recently penned a newspaper article that mentioned Mr Xi 52 times), he is not considered an ally. But if Mr Xi sees a need to foster elite unity, Mr Hu could join the Standing Committee—and maybe become prime minister.
新的阵容还可以反映最近的挫折迫使习近平妥协的程度。 一个迹象将是 67 岁的李克强会发生什么，预计他将卸任总理。 另一个是胡春华的下场。 尽管他尽了最大的努力（他最近在一篇报纸文章中提到了习近平 52 次），但他并不被视为盟友。 但如果习先生认为有必要促进精英团结，胡先生可以加入常委会——并可能成为总理。
No member of the sixth generation is likely to be considered Mr Xi’s heir for the moment. He has avoided anointing a successor ever since he broke with convention by not elevating a next-generation figure to the Standing Committee in 2017. Most favourites to join it now will be too old to replace him if he stays on for another decade. More realistic, perhaps, is that younger figures emerge as potential heirs after joining the Standing Committee in 2027.
目前，任何第六代人都不太可能被视为习近平的继承人。 自从他在 2017 年打破常规，没有将下一代人物提拔为常务委员会以来，他一直避免任命继任者。如果他再留任 10 年，现在加入该委员会的大多数热门人选都太老了，无法取代他。 更现实的或许是，在 2027 年加入常委会后，更年轻的人物成为潜在的继承人。
So, for now, Mr Xi’s current and aspiring protégés will continue vying for his favour. That makes them less likely to unite against him, but heightens the risk that infighting and inertia impair good governance. Some draw parallels with Vladimir Putin, who prevented challenges to his rule by promoting loyalists from his past (especially KGB veterans) and having them compete with each other.
因此，就目前而言，习近平目前和有抱负的门徒将继续争夺他的青睐。 这使得他们不太可能联合起来反对他，但增加了内讧和惰性损害良好治理的风险。 有些人与黄俄の爹相提并论，后者通过提拔他过去的忠诚者（尤其是克格勃退伍军人）并让他们相互竞争来阻止对他的统治的挑战。
Victor Shih of the University of California, San Diego, also sees similarities with Mao, who elevated weak or compromised figures to preserve his own power. Mr Xi has not quite reached that point. He is promoting competent acolytes with narrow power-bases. But that may change, Mr Shih says: “As he gets older and weaker, he'll have to adjust towards the Maoist model, because of this fear that someone's going to launch a coup late in his life.” ■
加州大学圣地亚哥分校的 Victor Shih 也看到了与毛泽东的相似之处，毛泽东提升软弱或妥协的人物以维护自己的权力。 习还没有达到那个地步。 他正在提拔权力基础狭窄的称职追随者。 但这种情况可能会改变，施先生说：“随着年龄的增长和虚弱，他将不得不适应毛泽东的模式，因为担心有人会在他的晚年发动政变。” ■标红字体均为楼主更改，与原文作者无关。
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