[2022-08-26] 纽约时报 - 若台海爆发冲突，中国可能怎样封锁台湾

 

By Chris Buckley, Pablo Robles, Marco Hernandez and Amy Chang ChienAug. 25, 2022
China is honing its ability to blockade Taiwan, giving Beijing the option of cutting off the self-ruled island in its campaign to take control of it.
储百亮, PABLO ROBLES, MARCO HERNANDEZ, AMY CHANG CHIEN
2022年8月25日
中国正在磨练其封锁台湾的能力，让北京可以选择切断这个自治岛屿以控制它。

Taiwan’s geography leaves it vulnerable to a blockade. Its population, industry and ports are concentrated on its western flank, closest to China.
台湾的地理位置使其容易受到封锁。其人口、工业和港口都集中在离中国最近的西侧。

 

China could impose a blockade, by sending ships and submarines to prevent vessels from entering or leaving Taiwan’s ports. It could use warplanes and missiles to dominate the skies.
中国可以通过派遣舰船、潜艇来实施封锁，以防止船只进出台湾港口。它可以使用战机和导弹得到制空权。

 

Even a limited blockade would threaten one of the world’s busiest trade routes. Much of the shipping traffic in the Taiwan Strait goes to the ports of Kaohsiung and Taichung on the island’s west.
即使是有限的封锁也会威胁到世界上最繁忙的贸易路线之一。台湾海峡的大部分航运都流向该岛西部的高雄和台中港口。

 

China’s military exercises this month were not a blockade. They were meant to intimidate Taiwan and the United States. They also showed how China is trying to normalize its presence in areas near Taiwan, raising the risk of conflict.
中国本月的军事演习并非封锁。其目的是恐吓台湾和美国。演习还展示了中国如何试图将台湾附近地区的军事存在常态化，增加了冲突的风险。

For decades, Beijing has had its sights on Taiwan, the self-governing island that China claims as its own. It has built up the People’s Liberation Army with the goal of ultimately taking Taiwan, if efforts to unify peacefully fail. It has modernized its forces, developing the world’s largest navy, which now challenges American supremacy in the seas around Taiwan.
几十年来，北京一直紧盯着这座其声称拥有主权的自治岛屿。人民解放军的建设以一旦和平手段失败就武力统一台湾为目标。这支军队已经实现了现代化，发展了世界上最大的海军，对美国在台湾周边海域的霸权地位构成挑战。

While China likely still lacks the ability to quickly invade and seize Taiwan, it could try to impose a blockade to force the island into concessions or as a precursor to wider military action. In this scenario, China would attempt to subdue Taiwan by choking it and its 23 million people in a ring of ships and aircraft, cutting it off physically, economically and even digitally.
虽然中国可能仍缺乏快速入侵和占领台湾的能力，但它也可能试图实施封锁以迫使该岛做出让步，或作为更广泛军事行动的前奏。在这种情况下，中国将试图用舰艇和飞机封锁台湾及其2300万居民，从实体、经济甚至网络层面将其与外界隔绝，从而迫使其就范。

China tried to use its military exercises this month to signal confidence in the People’s Liberation Army’s ability to encircle Taiwan. The military fired ballistic missiles into the waters off Taiwan, 80 miles off China’s coast, sending at least four high over the island itself, according to Japan, and conducted exercises in zones closer to the island than ever before.
中国试图利用本月的军事演习来表明中国人民解放军有能力包围台湾。据日本称，中国军方向距离中国海岸约130公里的台湾海域发射了弹道导弹，至少有四枚弹道导弹飞越台湾上空，并在该岛附近的区域进行了演习。

 

In “The Science of Strategy,” a key textbook for People’s Liberation Army officers, Taiwan is not mentioned, but the target is clear. The textbook describes a “strategic blockade” as a way to “destroy the enemy’s external economic and military connections, degrade its operational capacity and war-fighting potential, and leave it isolated and unaided.”
解放军军官重点教材《战略学》中没有提到台湾，但目标很明确。教科书将“战略封锁”描述为“破坏敌对外经济、军事联系，消弱其作战能力和战争潜力，使其孤立无援”的一种方式。

During this month’s exercises, China avoided more provocative moves that could have triggered a more forceful response from Taiwan. But it still sought to convey real menace, putting Taiwan on notice about the risks of not meeting Beijing’s demands.
在本月的演习中，中国避免了可能引发台湾更强烈反应的更具挑衅性的举动。但它仍然试图传达真正的威胁，让台湾意识到不听北京的话的风险。

“I think they have shown their intentions, encircling Taiwan and countering foreign intervention,” said Ou Si-fu, a research fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, which is affiliated with Taiwan’s Defense Ministry. “Their assumption was ‘Taiwan can be isolated, and so next I can fight you.’”
“我认为他们已经表明了他们的意图，包围台湾，反击外国干预，”台湾国防部下属的国防与安全研究所研究员欧锡富说。“它这个假设就是等于把台湾孤立了，那接下来我就可以打你。”

Real Blockade Would Seek to Repel U.S. Forces
真正的封锁将寻求击退美军

After Speaker Nancy Pelosi defied Beijing’s warnings and visited Taiwan on Aug. 2, China retaliated by deploying warplanes, ships and missiles for 72 hours of drills. It declared six exercise areas around Taiwan, including off the island’s eastern coast, in an effort to project its power farther from the Chinese mainland.
在南希·佩洛西议长无视北京的警告并于8月2日访台后，中国部署战机、舰船和导弹，以一场72小时的军演进行报复。它宣布了六个台湾周围的演习区，包括台湾东海岸外，以将其军力投射到远离中国大陆的一侧。

The exercises were not a full-scale rehearsal. In a real blockade, the 11 missiles that China fired into seas around Taiwan would have served little military purpose because they were designed to strike land targets, not ships. China did not roll out its most advanced weaponry. It flew planes near Taiwan, not over it. Although three of the sea zones China had designated for exercises intruded on territorial waters claimed by Taiwan, in practice Chinese missiles and ships avoided those waters.
这次演习不是一次全面军演。中国向台湾周围海域发射的11枚导弹在真实的封锁中没有太多军事用途，因为它们旨在打击陆地目标，而不是舰艇。中国没有拿出其最先进的武器。它派出飞机飞到台湾附近，而不是飞到台湾上空。尽管中国指定的演习海区中有三个已经侵占到台湾声称的领海，但实际上中国的导弹和舰船避开了这些水域。

“This is political warfare,” said Drew Thompson, a senior fellow at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in Singapore who formerly worked in the Pentagon. “The political aspect of what they do is sometimes more important than the actual training that they’re undertaking.”
“这是一场政治战，”曾在五角大楼工作的新加坡李光耀公共政策学院高级研究员唐安竹(Drew Thompson)说。“他们做事的政治成分有时比他们实际开展的演习更重要。”

An actual blockade would involve hundreds more ships and aircraft, as well as submarines, trying to seal off Taiwan’s ports and airports and repel possible intervention by warships and planes sent by the United States and its allies.
在真正的封锁中，将有数百艘船只、飞机和潜艇试图封锁台湾的港口和机场，并击退美国及其盟国可能为干预派出的军舰和飞机。

In a blockade, China would also need to control the skies. China has an array of naval and air bases on its east coast opposite Taiwan, and many more up and down its coast. The Chinese military could also try to shoot down enemy planes with surface-to-air missiles, or even strike at U.S. bases in Guam and Japan.
在封锁中，中国还需要控制空域。中国在与台湾隔海相望的东海岸拥有一系列海军和空军基地，在其他沿海地带还有更多。中国军方还可以尝试用地对空导弹击落敌机，甚至打击美国在关岛和日本的基地。中国的军事战略家将封锁视为一种战略，可以根据北京的目的，灵活地收紧或松开围绕台湾的绞索。鉴于台湾对燃料和食品进口的依赖，即使是有限的封锁——比如查验船只和要求特许权——也可能在政治和经济上冲击台湾。

 

China’s military strategists see a blockade as a strategy that gives them flexibility to tighten or loosen a noose around Taiwan, depending on Beijing’s objectives.
中国的军事战略家将封锁视为一种战略，可以根据北京的目标灵活地收紧或放松围绕台湾的绞索。

China could impose a limited blockade by stopping and screening ships, without attacking Taiwan’s ports. Given Taiwan’s dependence on imports of fuel and food, even a temporary blockade could shock the island politically and economically, allowing China a forceful way to press its demands.
中国可以通过拦截和检查船只来实施有限的封锁，而不攻击台湾的港口。 鉴于台湾对燃料和食品进口的依赖，即使是暂时的封锁也可能在政治和经济上冲击台湾，从而使中国能够以强有力的方式满足其要求。

“This makes it possible to start and stop once Taiwan ‘learns its lesson,’” said Phillip C. Saunders of the National Defense University, who is a co-editor of a new collection of essays assessing Chinese military choices for Taiwan.
美国国防大学的菲利普·C·桑德斯说，有了封锁就可以实现“随时开始，一旦台湾‘得到教训’就可以停手”，他与人共同编辑了一部评估中国对台湾的军事选择的新论文集。

But the People’s Liberation Army trains for a blockade that “would be violent and would generate a lot of international costs,” Mr. Saunders said. In that scenario, China could use a blockade to support an attempt at a full invasion. That step could unleash a potentially protracted and devastating conflict, as well as a major international backlash against China that would bring it economic damage and political isolation.
这样的举动可能会升级为全面冲突，可能造成长期性和毁灭性的结果。中国将冒着遭受重大反弹的风险，这将带来经济损失和国际孤立。

The uncertainties of the outcome from any war at sea and in the air would be immense for all involved.
海战和空战的不确定性对所有参与者来说都是巨大的。

China Sees Information as a Key Battleground
中国视信息为关键战场

In a real conflict to seize Taiwan, China would also seek to control the information landscape. It could use propaganda, disinformation, cyberwarfare and other tools in the hope of drumming up support at home and sowing fear and discord in Taiwan and across the world.
如果真的要占领台湾，中国还将寻求控制信息领域。它可以利用宣传、虚假信息、网络战和其他工具以期在国内获得支持，在台湾和全世界播下恐惧和不和。

During the recent exercises, the People’s Liberation Army put out a torrent of videos, pictures and reports that blurred the line between propaganda and misinformation. The campaign included footage of jet fighters taking off, missiles fired, warships on patrol and a hospital train ferrying troops, all intended to show a force ready for combat. But it also appeared to exaggerate Chinese capabilities by depicting its forces as bigger and closer to Taiwan than they were in reality.
在最近的演习期间，解放军发布了大量视频、图片和报道，说不清这些内容究竟是政治宣传还是虚假信息。其中包括战斗机起飞、导弹发射、军舰巡逻和医疗列车运送士兵的场面，一切都是为了展现军队已做好战斗准备的姿态。但这似乎也夸大了中国的军事能力，将部队描绘得比现实中规模更大也更接近台湾。

Chinese military planners regard cyberwarfare as important in any conflict, and experts say that in a real conflict China would use cyberattacks to try to knock out Taiwan’s communications and even paralyze some of its weapons. “Whoever controls information and controls the internet will have the whole world,” the Chinese military’s main textbook on strategy says, citing the late American futurist, Alvin Toffler.
中国的军事规划者认定网络战在任何冲突中都非常关键，专家们表示，若真发生冲突，中国会使用网络攻击，试图破坏台湾的通信，甚至造成其武器系统的瘫痪。“谁掌握了信息，控制了网络，谁就拥有整个世界，”中国军方的主流战略教科书援引已故美国未来学家阿尔文·托夫勒的话称。

During Ms. Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, the island experienced sporadic, unsophisticated cyberattacks of unclear origin, creating more nuisance than disruption. At least four Taiwanese government websites endured brief cyberattacks. Hackers took over electronic displays at several 7-Eleven stores and at the Xinzuoying train station in Kaohsiung to display messages condemning Ms. Pelosi.
佩洛西访台期间，台湾岛遭遇了零散且并不复杂的不明网络攻击，制造的干扰多于破坏。至少有四家台湾政府官网遭到短暂的网络攻击。黑客侵入了多家7-11便利店以及高雄市新左营车站的电子显示屏，展示了谴责佩洛西的信息。

 

In an actual conflict, China could also try to sever or disable undersea cables that carry about 90 percent of the data that connects Taiwan to the world, some military experts on the island said. The cables’ “main weak point is where they emerge from the bottom of the sea,” said Mr. Ou, the Taiwanese researcher.
台湾一些军事专家表示，在实际冲突中，中国也可能尝试切断或毁坏海底电缆，这些电缆传输了台湾与全球联络的约90%的数据。其“主要的薄弱之处就在它们从海底露出来的部位”，台湾研究员欧锡富表示。

Cutting Taiwan’s undersea cables would also spark chaos affecting other interconnected countries in the region, such as Japan and South Korea.
切断台湾海底电缆还可能会引发混乱，影响到该地区其他互联国家，如日本和韩国。

 

China Is Creating a New Normal
中国正在创造新常态

Even after completing this month’s large-scale drills, the People’s Liberation Army has continued to intensify its presence in the Taiwan Strait. Chinese military forces have increased their flights over the so-called median line, an informal boundary between the two sides that they had rarely crossed in the past.
在完成本月的大规模演习后，解放军仍在继续强化其在台湾海峡的存在。中国军队增加了飞越所谓海峡中线的次数，这是两岸的非正式边界，以往双方都很少越过。

These flights signal a new normal for Chinese military activity closer to Taiwan, underscoring Beijing’s position that it does not accept the island’s claims of sovereign boundaries. Increasingly frequent and close-up exercises also raise the risk that Taiwan could become desensitized and be caught by a surprise attack. It would take minutes for a jet screaming across that line to be over the island if it stayed its course, instead of turning back as the aircraft do now.
这些飞行标志着中国在台湾附近军事活动进入了新常态，凸显了北京不接受台湾主权边界主张的立场。愈发频繁的近距离演练也可能导致台湾放松警惕，并遭遇突然袭击。如果战机保持既定航线，而不是像现在这样返航，那么它需要几分钟时间就可以高速越线，进入台湾上空。

“Maybe in the future this kind of action will be like the frog being cooked in boiling water,” said Shu Hsiao-huang, a researcher at Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research. “This kind of harassment may become the norm.”
“未来可能就是这种行为也会温水煮青蛙，”台湾国防安全研究院的研究员舒孝煌说。“这种袭扰可能会变成常态。”

 

In the first three weeks of this month, China dispatched more than 600 military aircraft to buzz the airspace near the island, an unprecedented jump in these flights.
本月的前三周，中国共派出超过350架次军机进入台湾岛附近空域，这样的增幅是前所未有的。

“As the United States and external forces, including Taiwan independence forces, make constant provocations, exercises will become more intense and more frequent, broader in time and scope,” said Song Zhongping, a military commentator in Beijing who is a former Chinese military officer.
“随着美国和域外势力包括台独势力不断地挑衅，这种演练将会比以前力度更大，频度更大。而且演练的时间、范围都会更广，”前解放军军官、现为北京的军事评论员宋忠平表示。

China has in recent years made more and more military flights into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone, a space bigger than the island’s sovereign airspace, as a controlled way of demonstrating Beijing’s anger with Taiwan. Now, by intruding daily into the zone, China’s forces are also potentially attempting to wear down Taiwanese air force planes and pilots. Among the flights recorded by Taiwan this month, many have been fighter jets, but surveillance planes, helicopters and other craft have also been identified.
近年来，中国大陆越来越多地派遣军用飞机进入台湾的防空识别区（该区域比台湾的主权空域要大），以此在可控范围内表达北京对台湾的愤怒。现在，通过每天侵入该识别区，中国大陆军队还可能试图削弱台湾空军的飞机和飞行员。在本月的飞行中大部分是战斗机，但也发现了侦察机、直升机和其他飞机。

 

China’s leaders have long said that they want to absorb Taiwan peacefully. Even so, as Beijing grows more anxious about Taiwan and about deterring the United States from supporting the island, its displays of force may intensify. Even if no side wants a war, there is a growing risk of a superpower confrontation that could ultimately lay waste to Taiwan.
中国领导人长期以来一直表示，他们希望和平收复台湾。即便如此，随着北京对台湾和对阻止美国支持台湾变得越来越焦虑，它的武力展示可能会加强。即使没有任何一方希望发生战争，超级大国对抗的风险也在增长，最终可能破坏台湾。

“The Chinese have a political problem in that every time they feel compelled to make a really big political statement like this, they have to do more than they did before,” said Lonnie Henley, a former U.S. intelligence officer specializing in China’s military who now lectures at George Washington University. “I worry that at some point they’re going to run out of headroom for doing ever-louder saber rattling.”
“中国人有一个政治问题，每次他们觉得有必要做出一个像这样的重大政治声明时，他们必须比以前做得更多，”专门研究中国军事、目前在乔治华盛顿大学授课的前美国情报官员隆尼·亨利说。“我担心，在某个时候，他们将不再有进行更多越来越大声的武力威胁的空间。”

Notes on the Maps
地图注释

Maps showing the August military exercise areas were drawn based on maps published by Chinese state media on Aug. 2.
显示8月军演区域的地图根据中国官方媒体8月2日公布的地图绘制。

Marine traffic density maps are based on vessel positions reported between January 2015 and February 2021 processed by the International Monetary Fund’s World Seaborne Trade monitoring system.
海上交通密度图的依据为2015年1月至2021年2月间见诸报端的舰艇位置，经过国际货币基金组织的世界海运贸易监控系统处理。

标红字体均为楼主更改，与原文作者无关。

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